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Abstract
When time preferences are heterogeneous and bounded away from one, how “much”
cooperation can be achieved by an ongoing group? How does group cooperation vary with
the group’s size and structure? This paper examines characteristics of cooperative behavior
in the class of symmetric, repeated games of collective action. These are games characterized
by “free rider problems" in the level of cooperation achieved. Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
games are a special case.
We characterize the level of maximal average cooperation (MAC), the highest average
level of cooperation, over all stationary subgame perfect equilibrium paths, that the group
can achieve. The MAC is shown to be increasing in monotone shifts, and decreasing in
mean preserving spreads of the distribution of discount factors. The latter suggests that
more heterogeneous groups are less cooperative on average. Finally, in a class of Prisoner’s
Dilemma games, we show under weak conditions that the MAC exhibits increasing returns
to scale in a range of heterogeneous discount factors. That is, larger groups are more
cooperative, on average, than smaller ones. By contrast, when the group has a common
discount factor, the MAC is invariant to group size.
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Successful cooperation at some level is required in any group. In most contexts, teams,
clubs, and partnerships function most eﬀectively when their members get along with one
another. When they do not, substantial social conﬂicts often result.
This paper examines characteristics of group cooperation in repeated, collective action
games. Consider a group with n members. Each group member, i =1 ,...,n,h a sd i s c o u n t
factor δi in the repeated game. In each period Member i chooses a normalized level of eﬀort
or contribution, pi ∈ [0,1], which indicates how cooperative he is toward other members
of the group. As is standard in collective action games, the individual is better oﬀ the
more cooperative are all members in the aggregate. However, each has a (static) incentive
to behave uncooperatively, i.e., to “free ride.” Moreover, the marginal incentive to free
ride weakly increases in the aggregate cooperation of the group. Consequently, pi =0for
all members is the unique Nash equilibrium of the stage game. One such example is the
Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Voluntary provision of a public good is another.
How “much” cooperation can this group achieve on average? How does the mix of
patient and impatient group members aﬀect the level of cooperation in equilibrium? Does
the size of the group matter?
The answers to these questions are straightforward in polar cases. For instance, if for all
members i and j, δi = δj is close to zero (uniform impatience), then free rider incentives of
the stage game take over, and so joint cooperation cannot be sustained. On the other hand,
if δi = δj is close to one (uniform patience), equilibria exist in which all group members
are “fully" cooperative each period.1 In both of these cases, group size plays no substantive
role.
The intermediate cases are harder and not well understood. We therefore depart from
the traditional focus on uniformly patient players in repeated games.2 Consider, instead,
an arbitrary proﬁle of discount factors for the group. We examine paths arising from the set
of stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE), i.e., equilibria in which, after any history,
a stationary proﬁle of actions is played thereafter. Speciﬁcally, consider a stationary proﬁle






over SSPE paths. The value of this program is a level of cooperation, p∗(n,δ) ∈ [0,1],w h i c h
we call the maximal average cooperation (MAC).
1Clearly, full cooperation is a particular application of the Folk Theorem. See, as a standard reference,
Fudenberg and Maskin (1986).
2Other work which departs from the uniform patience assumption is discussed later in this Section.
1The maximal average cooperation (MAC) describes the highest average level of cooper-
ation attainable by the group each period when behavior is stationary. We are interested
in it, rather than in group welfare, because it is cardinal and is calculated from behavior
directly. Direct measurement of behavior is desirable in ﬁrms, teams, and other organiza-
tions. Such organizations are often hierarchical; individuals are organized in teams that
self-monitor individual behavior while the aggregate outcome is evaluated by a supervisor.
Players’ payoﬀs are not directly observed. In such cases, a group’s eﬀectiveness might be
judged by its average cooperative eﬀort.
As a measure of group cooperation the MAC is, in some sense, restrictive. Clearly,
it is meaningful only if individual actions have an agreed upon cardinal interpretation.
Moreover, because it is derived from stationary equilibria, it entails some loss of generality
when discounting is heterogeneous. A recent paper by Lehrer and Pauzner (1999) shows that
t h ef e a s i b l ep a y o ﬀ set changes when discounting is heterogeneous. In particular, equilibrium
payoﬀs typically exist outside the convex hull of the stage game payoﬀ set if individuals are
suﬃciently but heterogeneously patient.
Despite the imperfections, we argue that the MAC is a useful concept for understanding
group cooperation when discounting is heterogeneous. The MAC and, in particular, the
stationary equilibria from which the MAC is derived, can be justiﬁed on two main grounds.
(1) First and foremost, so little is known about equilibria when discounting is bounded away
from either one or zero that it is sensible to start with an approach that admits a transparent
comparison with standard models. In particular, because the stationary feasible payoﬀ set
does not change if discounting is heterogeneous, stationary equilibria can isolate changes due
to equilibrium behavior rather than due to changes in feasibility constraints. Indeed, when
discounting is heterogeneous, the problem with nonstationary equilibria is precisely one of
sorting out these two eﬀects – feasibility and equilibrium. For this reason, comparative
statics exercises are less informative when nonstationary equilibria are considered.
(2) Stationary equilibria facilitate objective measurement of the group by an external
agent. This is especially relevant in a ﬁrm or an organization. By contrast, nonstationary
equilibria present problems for measurement since it is unclear how cooperation early in the
game should be weighted against cooperation later if there is no common discount factor.
Surprisingly, the literature on repeated games with intermediate and/or heterogeneous
discounting is sparse. The literature studying a common discount factor taking intermediate
values is more common. Sorin (1986), Cave (1987), Stahl (1991), and Mailath, Obara, and
Sekiguchi (2002) all study the payoﬀ set of repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma with a common
discount factor bounded away from one.
The literature on heterogeneous discounting typically studies behavior in the “heteroge-
neous limit,” meaning that relative diﬀerences between the diﬀerent agents’ discount factors
are maintained while discounting approaches one. Lehrer and Pauzner (LP) (1999) charac-
2terize equilibrium payoﬀs in two player games in the limit as period length goes to zero while
maintaining a ﬁxed log ratio
log(δ1)
log(δ2) between the two discount factors. Heterogeneous limits
are also examined by Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990), who prove a Folk Theorem for
a subset of the players when the other players’ discount factors are 0, and by Fudenberg and
Levine (1989), Celantani, et al. (1995), and Aoyagi (1996) all of whom examine reputation-
building by a suﬃciently patient, long run player who faces a sequence of short run players
in a repeated game. Harrington (1989) characterizes the bounds on heterogeneous discount
factors required to achieve collusion in oligopolies. In a precursor to the present paper, Haag
and Lagunoﬀ (2005a) examine stationary trigger strategies in a local interaction network
with heterogeneous discounting.
The present paper does not restrict discounting to be common or asymptotically close
to one. Section 2 demonstrates how the MAC varies across diﬀerent discounting proﬁles in
a simple example of a two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Section 3 introduces a general
class of symmetric collective action stage games.3 Our main results are contained in Sections
4-6. Section 4 deﬁnes the MAC for the class of collective action games. We show that the
MAC is characterized by a maximal ﬁxed point of a particular function. Properties of this
function reveal how and to what degree the equilibrium can accommodate intermediate
levels of cooperation.
Section 5 examines the eﬀect on cooperation when the composition of the group changes
(holding size ﬁxed). The main ﬁnding in this Section is that mean preserving spreads reduce
the MAC. In other words, greater group heterogeneity lowers cooperation. Increased social
conﬂict is generated by increasingly diﬀerent time preferences. The intuition, roughly, is
that because a relatively patient individual is already cooperating more than a relatively
impatient one, he faces less cooperation from his rivals. Consequently, he gains less on
the margin from a given decrease in cooperation than would an impatient individual. An
increment in the patient player’s discount factor therefore has a smaller net eﬀect than a
corresponding decrement in the impatient player’s.
Unfortunately, the class of collective action games includes all sorts of stage games that
are not neutral to size. In order to separate eﬀects of the repeated game from “built-in”
eﬀects of the stage game, Section 6 restricts attention to a subclass of “size-neutral" stage
games that conform to n-Player Prisoner’s Dilemma. We show that under fairly broad
conditions and over a nondegenerate range of discount factor proﬁles, the MAC in the
repeated PD game exhibits increasing returns to scale, i.e., the average level of cooperation
of the scaled up group exceeds that of the original group.
The surprising thing about the result is that the static PD game itself exhibits a “non-
increasing returns to scale” property: a player’s marginal payoﬀ in the PD game, hence his
marginal incentive to free ride, is increasing in size. Hence, the result on increasing returns
3We restrict attention to symmetric games so that the source of heterogeneity among players is isolated
to the discount factors.
3comes precisely from the repetition of the game. Just as signiﬁcantly, the heterogeneous
discounting is critical to the result. The assumptions do not hold, and the result fails, when
discounting is homogeneous. Speciﬁcally, when players’ time preferences are the same, the
MAC is invariant to group size.
T h ei n t u i t i o nf o rt h er e s u l tc a nb es e e ni na2 - p e r s o ng r o u pw i t ha“ p a t i e n t "a n d
an“impatient" player. If this group is replicated once, doubling in size, then the patient
player faces one other patient player and two impatient players. Whereas before, he faced
one impatient player. Hence the proportion of patient to impatient players has changed
favorably for the patient player. Consequently, the marginal response to a change in scale
is positive above a ﬁxed threshold discount factor and is negative below it. However, the
magnitudes of these marginal responses are diﬀerent for patient and impatient players. Im-
patience has a dampening eﬀect: an impatient player cares less about the future responses
of others to his current action. Consequently, the positive response of the patient player to
an increase in group size exceeds in absolute value the negative response of the impatient
one.
The size result casts some doubt on the prevailing wisdom about free rider problems that
comes primarily from analysis of static games. Beginning with Olson (1965), the standard
wisdom is that free rider problems worsen with size.4 This “Olson Conjecture," as it has
come to be known, is discussed along with related literature in Section 7. This section also
summarizes our ﬁndings and discusses limitations and possibilities for future work. Finally,
Section 8 is an Appendix which contains all the proofs of the results.
2 A Prisoner’s Dilemma Example
To see how the MAC is determined, we begin with what we view as the quintessential
collective action problem: the Prisoner’s Dilemma game given by the matrix below.
CD
C c,c - ,d
D d,-  0,0
Figure 1: Prisoner’s Dilemma
For Prisoner’s Dilemma we require that d>c>0 > − ,a n d2c>d−  .F o rn o w ,t o
make the PD game consistent with n-player collective action games examined later, we also
4To be fair, Olson outlined several possible reasons, most of which are not taken up formally here or
elsewhere in the literature, for the ineﬀectiveness of larger groups. See Section 7 for a discussion of the
literature.
4assume submodularity, i.e., d− >c . This means that a player’s net payoﬀ from switching
to D is larger if his rival chooses C.5
Suppose players can choose mixed strategies where pi is the probability of choosing C
by Player i =1 ,2.T h e nP l a y e ri’s payoﬀ in the mixed extension of the PD game is:
pi(pjc − (1 − pj) )+( 1− pi)pjd (2)
In the repeated game it is sometimes assumed that the history of mixed strategies pi
is itself observed. Observability of mixed strategies is not a problem in the Folk Theorem
literature since payoﬀs in the limiting case where δ → 1 can always be replicated by time
averaging. The approximation deteriorates, however, when discount factors move away from
one. Other than as an approximation, we can think of no obvious example where players’
mixed actions are observable. Hence, in the general model in Section 3, pi is a continuous
pure action, and the payoﬀ expression in (2) is that of the base, stage game. We only use
the mixed strategy interpretation in this Section for its familiarity to readers and for its
usefulness as an illustrative device.
Whether pi is pure or mixed, Player i’s payoﬀ is decreasing in his own action, and
increasing in his rival’s. The unique Nash equilibrium is (p1,p 2)=( 0 ,0). However, when
t h eP Dg a m ei si n ﬁnitely repeated, it is a standard exercise to show that full cooperation,
i.e., pi =1for each i, can be sustained as a subgame perfect equilibrium if both individuals
are suﬃciently patient. We examine how well they do if one or both discount factors falls
below the “patience threshold?”
Let δi denote the discount factor of individual i =1 ,2. Each individual uses δi to
calculate his average discounted sum of payoﬀs. A pair (p1,p 2) constitutes a stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium (SSPE) if, for each i =1 ,2,a n dj 6= i,
pi(pjc − (1 − pj) )+( 1− pi)pjd ≥ (1 − δi)pjd (3)
The right hand side of (3) is the one shot gain from a deviation to the most uncooperative
action, pi =0 , with the consequence that both members permanently revert thereafter to
the one shot Nash equilibrium, (D,D).
Inequality (3) yields this system of inequalities
δ1p2 ≥ p1(p2μ +( 1− p2)γ)
δ2p1 ≥ p2(p1μ +( 1− p1)γ)
(4)
where μ ≡ (d − c)/d and γ ≡  /d.6 The ﬁrst inequality is Player 1’s incentive constraint
against deviating to D. The second inequality is the identical incentive constraint for
5T h ec a s eo fd −  <cis examined later in this Section.
6Note that by our submodularity assumption, μ>γsince d>c+  .
5Player 2. Clearly, full cooperation, i.e., (p1,p 2)=( 1 ,1) solves this system whenever δi ≥
μ ≡ (d − c)/d for both i =1 ,2. In this case the Folk Theorem property applies.
However, when δi <μfor either or both players, partial cooperation is still possible. In
any SSPE, (p1,p 2), the constraints bind for either, both, or neither player depending on the
value of the discount factors. Clearly, if a constraint does not bind, then for that player i,
it must be that pi =1since otherwise, his cooperation can be increased without violating
the incentive constraint of the other player. Solving the system (4) for each possible case,
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2 ≤ δ1δ2 <μ γ+m i n {δ1,δ2}(μ − γ)
0 if δ1δ2 <γ 2
(5)
In expression (5), the MAC takes on distinct values in each of ﬁve regions in discount
factor space. These regions are exhibited in Figure 2a. For example, the conditions which






are those in which Player 2’s constraint does not bind, and
Player 1’s does bind. In this case, Player 2 cooperates with certainty, while Player 1 “par-
tially cooperates,” choosing C with probability less than one. Solving for Player 1’s binding
constraint when p2 =1gives p1 = δ1/μ ≡ δ1/d−c
d . Hence, a player who discounts to 20% of
the full cooperation threshold μ is uncooperative 20% of the time.
A few remarks about (5) are warranted. First, note that p∗ is (weakly) increasing and
continuous in the pair (δ1,δ2). It is also decreasing in (arithmetic) mean preserving spreads
of the original pair (δ1,δ2). This means that the larger is the diﬀerence in the two players’
time preferences, other things equal, the less cooperative is the group on average. To see
this for two special cases, suppose ﬁrst both players are at the critical discount factor for
full cooperation, i.e., δi = μ,f o rb o t hi =1 ,2. A mean preserving spread takes at least
one individual below his full cooperation region, thereby lowering the MAC . Alternatively,
suppose that both players are just at the critical discount factor for positive cooperation,
i.e., δi = γ,f o rb o t hi =1 ,2. Then a mean preserving spread reduces the MAC to 0 since the
product of the two discount factors with arithmetic mean of γ is maximized at δ1 = δ2 = γ.
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Fig. 2a: The Submodular Case
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Fig. 2b: The Supermodular Case
Second, a noteworthy special case of Equation (5) is the common discount factor case
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1 if ¯ δ ≥ μ
¯ δ−γ
μ−γ if γ ≤ ¯ δ<μ
0 if ¯ δ<γ
(6)
Third, 2-player games are somewhat special since there is always a re-ordering of one
player’s strategy set that renders any game submodular. Hence, the supermodular case of
μ<γyields similar, but not identical, results. In the supermodular game the incentives
to cooperate increase precisely when the other player is more cooperative. In this case, the
region in which both players cooperate disappears except for a nongeneric boundary case of
δ1δ2 = μγ+min{δ1,δ2}(μ−γ) (see Figure 2b). The regions that deﬁne partial cooperation
for one player and full cooperation for another are the same. The region in which there is
no cooperation is given by δ1δ2 <μ γ+m i n {δ1,δ2}(μ − γ). As before, cooperation always
(weakly) increases in delta. Typically, n-player collective action games are submodular, and
7For some reason, many of the studies of repeated games with common discounting examine a knife-
edged case of Prisoner’s Dilemma where μ = γ (Stahl (1991) is an exception). This assumption, in our case,
would lead to the ﬂawed conclusion that partial cooperation is never sustainable. We show that it is, for
both players, when μ>γ . Partial cooperation for exactly one player is sustainable when μ<γ .
7so this case is of limited interest.
Fourth, this example cannot address questions of group size. To answer these, the general
n-group model is developed in the subsequent section.
3 Collective Action Games
A collection of n individuals play an inﬁnitely repeated game in discrete time t =0 ,1,....
We refer to this collection as the “n-group” or, more simply, “the group.” In each period, the
stage game is as follows. Each member i of the n-group chooses a number, pi,f r o mas e t[0,1]
of feasible actions. The action pi determines member i’s chosen level of cooperation toward
the group. Notationally, we will let P =
P
j pj denote the aggregate level of cooperation,
and P−i =
P
j6=i pj, the aggregate level of cooperation excluding group member i.A na c t i o n
proﬁle is given by p =( p1,...p n). Individual i’s payoﬀ of proﬁle p is given by ¯ πi(p).
G i v e na ni n ﬁnite repetition of a game with payoﬀs (¯ πi)n
i=1,l e tp(t) denote the action






where δi denote the discount factor of member i.L e tδ =( δ1,...,δ n) denote the (arbitrary)
proﬁle of discount factors of the group.
Our analysis is restricted to the symmetric class of collective action stage games. Roughly,
a collective action game is a game in which the payoﬀ ¯ πi for individual i is increasing in
the aggregate level of cooperation of all members of the group, but assumed to decrease in
his own level of cooperation in the aggregate. Moreover, one’s incentive to cooperative is
assumed to decrease in the aggregate level of cooperation.
We follow the canonical convention in assuming that a collective action game is anony-
mous. Speciﬁcally, we assume a game represented by a payoﬀ function πi :I R
2
+ → IR for i
satisfying πi(pi,P)=¯ πi(p) where, recall, P =
P
j pj is the aggregate level of cooperation.
A collective action game is any proﬁle (πi)n
i=1 that satisﬁes properties (A1)-(A5) below.
(A1) (Symmetry) (πi) is a symmetric game, i.e., πi = π for all i.
(A2) (Monotonicity) For each i, π is C2, strictly increasing in its second argument, strictly







8(A3) (Concavity) π is weakly, jointly concave in all variables.
(A4) (Submodularity) π is weakly submodular in p and P in the natural order:8 if p0
i ≥ pi








(A5) (Normalization) π(0,0) = 0 and there exists 1 < ¯ P<n ,s u c ht h a tπ(1, ¯ P)=0 .
Other than the normalization in (A5), which is largely a technical condition, these as-
sumptions describe standard properties of games with free rider problems. Namely, each in-
dividual always has an incentive to “under-contribute." This incentive generates the unique,
pure strategy Nash equilibrium of pi =0for all i. At the same time, some positive contri-
bution by all individuals is Pareto preferred to the Nash equilibrium.9
Assumption (A2) assumes monotonicity in both levels and relative diﬀerences. Speciﬁ-
cally, with a simple relabeling, the second inequality in (A2) may be expressed as π(pi,P) >
π(pi + y,P + y) for all y>0. In other words, identical increases in the private and ag-
gregate contributions decrease one’s payoﬀ.T h eﬁrst inequality expresses the same idea in
log diﬀerences. It entails that payoﬀsd e c r e a s eproportionately faster in the ﬁrst argument
(one’s own contribution) than they increase in the second (the aggregate contribution).
Finally, Assumption (A4) together with (A2) capture the “Olsonian" intuition that free
rider problems worsen the larger is the aggregate contribution. Notice that these games
have the property that the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ coincides with the minmax payoﬀ for
each player. This property can be relaxed, but at a signiﬁcant technical cost (see Footnote
12).
It is easy to check that the Prisoner’s Dilemma game in Section 2 is a special case.
Another special case is the game of voluntary provision of a public good. A canonical
representation of this is given by the payoﬀ π(pi,P)=F(P) − G(pi) where F is concave
and G is convex.
4 Maximal Average Cooperation
We assume that the histories (p(1),...,p(t)) are publicly observable and restrict attention
to stationary subgame perfect equilibria (SSPE). These are subgame perfect equilibria in
which, after any history, there is some proﬁle of actions such that this proﬁle is chosen in
8Equivalently, p and P are strategic substitutes in the natural order.
9In the unique equilibrium, π(0,0) = 0, while by Assumption (A5), for each P>¯ P,t h e nπ(pi,P) > 0
for all pi.
9each period thereafter.10 Because histories are publicly observed and the minmax payoﬀ is
sustained by a Nash equilibrium, any SSPE path in this class of games can be implemented
by an SSPE which uses simple “trigger strategies” in which any deviation is met with
permanent reversion to the one shot, “uncooperative” equilibrium. Hence, there is no
confusion when we refer to the stationary path proﬁle, p,a sastationary subgame perfect
equilibrium (SSPE).11









The optimal value of (8) is an action p∗ ∈ [0,1] that describes the maximal average co-
operation (MAC). In Section 5, the MAC will be denoted by p∗(n,δ) to mark the explicit
dependence on group’s size, n, and characteristics, δ.
In what follows, we ﬁxt h ei d e n t i t yi of a particular individual in the group. Fix a
type proﬁle δ and a stationary path, p(t)=p, ∀t. Using (16), we will say that a pair
(p,P) ∈ [0,1]n×[0,n] describes a SSPE if and only if
Pn
i=1 pi = P and for each i =1 ,2,...n,
π(pi,P) ≥ (1 − δi)π(0,P − pi)
which we rewrite as
Q(pi,P;δi) ≡ δiπ(0,P− pi)+[ π(pi,P) − π(0,P − pi)] ≥ 0 (9)
The reason (9) characterizes an SSPE is clear. Given that the minmax payoﬀ of 0 coincides
with the Nash equilibrium payoﬀ,i ts u ﬃces to verify the equilibrium against the worst
possible punishment – permanent reversion to the one shot equilibrium.12
By (A2), one can readily verify that Q is continuous in all variables. The following
Lemmatta establish some useful properties of the incentive constraint. The proofs of these
and all subsequent results are in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Q is strictly decreasing in pi.
10One could easily relax this deﬁnition to a weaker SSPE where stationarity applies only on the equilibrium
path. In that case oﬀ-path punishments need not be stationary. In our framework, however, the two are
equivalent: stationary punishments may be assumed without loss of generality – see footnote 11.
11 The argument for why there is no loss of generality is standard: since the minmax payoﬀ is 0, any
equilibrium path remains an equilibrium path if it is enforced by the threat of permanent reversion to the
one-shot equilibrium in which everyone in the group chooses “D” thereafter.
12 In the general case where the minmax payoﬀ diﬀered from the Nash equilibrium, we would have to verify
additional out-of-equilibrium “perfection" constraints. Nevertheless, Inequality (9) would still characterize
the on-path constraint.
10Next, ﬁxs o m eP and deﬁne δ(P) by
δ(P)=i n f{r ∈ [0,∞]: Qi(pi,P;r) ≥ 0, ∀pi ≤ min{1,P}} (10)
That is, δ(P) is the inﬁmum over the extended reals that satisﬁes the incentive constraint
for all levels, pi,o fi’s cooperation.
Lemma 2 For each i:
if 0 ≤ δi ≤ δi(P) then there exists pi ∈ [0,min{1,P}] such that Q(pi,P;δi)=0
if δi >δ i(P) ≥ 0 then Q(pi,P;δi) > 0, ∀pi ∈ [0,1]
Moreover, if P>1,t h e nδ(P) satisﬁes
π(1,P)=( 1− δ(P))π(0,P − 1) (11)
T h ep u r p o s eo ft h e s et w or e s u l t sc a nn o wb em a d ec l e a r . W ec a nn o wc o m b i n et h e s e
two Lemmatta to produce the following: for any P,i f0 ≤ δi ≤ δi(P) then there exists
pi ∈ [0,1] such that Q(pi,P;δi)=0and
∂Q(pi,P;δi)
∂pi 6=0 . The Implicit Function Theorem
thus implies existence of a locally continuous function R(·;δi) such that pi = R(P;δi) and
R(P;δi) satisﬁes Q(Ri(P;δi),P;δi)=0 (i.e., incentives bind at pi = R(P;δi)).





R(P,δi) if 0 ≤ δi ≤ δi(P)
1 if δi >δ i(P) ≥ 0
For each group member i, ψ(·;δi) is the maximal response to P. It describes the maximal
level of i’s cooperation consistent with i’s incentive constraint given aggregate cooperation





Here, Ψ(·;δ) is the aggregate maximal response to aggregate cooperation P.
Theorem 1 For any repeated collective action game, the MAC is given by
p




∈ [0,1] : P = Ψ(P;δ)
¾
(13)
where the solution to (13) is nonempty and Ψ(P) <P ,∀P>P ∗.
11According to the result, the MAC is the maximal ﬁxed point of Ψ divided by n. Letting
P∗ = np∗, the property Ψ(P) <P ,∀P>P ∗ is a tranversality property. It means that the
MAC crosses the 45◦ line and so it varies continuously with small perturbations the game’s
structure.
While the ﬁxed point characterization is somewhat reminiscent of standard ﬁxed point
logic for static games, the meaning and derivation are obviously diﬀerent. Rather than
coming from a best response correspondence, Ψ is an aggregate equilibrium response along
the equilibrium path of the repeated game.
5 Composition Eﬀects
The Characterization Result (Theorem 1) will prove useful because it is easier to evaluate
parametric changes in the ﬁxed point mapping Ψ, than to evaluate these changes in the MAC
directly. For example, if Ψ is increasing in δ, then it follows that the MAC is increasing in
δ. The former is much easier to establish directly than the latter.







distinct proﬁles of discount factors, and let p∗(n,δ
0) and p∗(n,δ
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0), with strict inequality if 0 <p ∗(n,δ
0) < 1.
The Proof shows that for each i, ψi is increasing and concave in δi. This establishes the
ﬁrst part. The second part then follows from a standard, second order stochastic dominance
argument. Note that one cannot generally infer strict inequality between the two since δ
00
may already place all individuals in the region of full cooperation (i.e., pi =1 , ∀i), and so
further increases in δ have no eﬀect.
12The fact that average cooperation “increases" in each member’s patience is, of course,
to be expected. However, the second statement in the Theorem is less obvious. Increased
heterogeneity increases the degree of social conﬂict. More patient individuals, it turns out,
are less responsive to increases in patience than impatient ones. The intuition, roughly, is
the following. The eﬀect of increasing a player’s discount factor is to increase the weight
on future punishment following a deviation. But since relatively more patient individual is
already cooperating more than an impatient individual, he faces less cooperation from his
rivals. Consequently, the patient player’s cooperation gains him less on the margin after an
increment in his discount factor than an impatient player loses after a decrement in his.
The result is reminiscent of a result in a recent paper by Dal Bo (2001). In a Bertrand
game with a common, but stochastic discount factor, he shows that higher variability in
the time distribution of discounting lowers prices and proﬁts of ﬁrms. Whereas our model
displays heterogeneity in agents and homogeneity in time, his model displays the opposite.
The mechanics of the two arguments are quite diﬀerent in any event.
6S i z e E ﬀects
The issue of scale of cooperation is more complicated. A corporate merger, for example,
requires the merger of two groups of workers, each of a diﬀerent size and each with diﬀerent
characteristics. It is certainly possible for the merger to increase both the size and the social
variability relative to each group. Hence, to isolate the eﬀect of size alone, we consider the
eﬀect of increasing n while ﬁxing the distribution on δ. The simplest construction replicates
the group α times, for some positive integer α. Speciﬁcally, if the group size is scaled from
n to αn, then there are α “copies" of each individual i with discount factor δi.F o r m a l l y ,
let δ(n)=( δ1,...,δn) denote the proﬁle of discount factors in order to express the explicit
dependence on group size. Then
δ(αn)=(
α z }| {
δ(n),δ(n),...,δ(n))
Recall that the MAC exhibits increasing (decreasing) returns at scale factor α if
p
∗(αn,δ(αn)) > (<) p
∗(n,δ(n)) (15)
Inequality (15) can be expressed equivalently as P∗
αn > (<) αP∗
n. Hence, increasing
(decreasing) returns to cooperation exist if maximal aggregate cooperation is superadditive
(subadditive).
O n em i g h tr e a s o n a b l ya s ki fo rw h e nt h eM A Ci nr e p e a t e dc o l l e c t i v ea c t i o ng a m e s
exhibits some form of returns to scale. Unfortunately, there can be no general answer
because these games have no “built-in" assumptions regarding size. For example, the payoﬀ
13functions, π1 = P − G(pi) and π2 = P
n − G(pi), both satisfy the axioms in Section 3. Yet,
each has a diﬀerent implications for group size. In the ﬁrst case, payoﬀsi n c r e a s ei nt h e
aggregate contribution, while in the second, payoﬀsi n c r e a s ei nt h eaverage contribution.
Clearly, the public good in the second example is congestable.
Given these limitations, we examine, as a starting point, eﬀects of size in a subclass of
games that generalizes 2-player Prisoner’s Dilemma games in Section 2. An n-player game
in this subclass has payoﬀsg i v e nb y
π(pi,P)=( P − pi)d − pi(P − pi)(d − c −  ) − pi(n − 1)  (16)
Here, c is the reward to mutual cooperation, d is the reward to (unilaterally) uncooperative
behavior, and   is the loss incurred from others’ uncooperative behavior. As before, d>
c>0 > − ,a n d2c>d−  >0.I ti se a s yt oc h e c kt h i sp a y o ﬀ satisﬁes (A1)-(A5), and is
equivalent to the mixed extension of PD game in which p =( 0 ,...,0) is the unique, stage
Nash equilibrium.13
This “PD” game is a canonical candidate for examining the Olson Conjecture. The
payoﬀ function has the interesting characteristic that the (marginal) incentive to free ride
increases with group size.14 Yet, despite the decreasing returns to scale of this stage game,
the MAC in the repeated version of this n-player PD is invariant to size when players
are homogeneous, i.e, δi = ¯ δ, ∀i. To see this, observe that when player’s discount factors
are homogeneous, the incentive constraints are identical and the SSPE is symmetric. The
incentive constraint then reduces to
Q(pi,P;δi) ≡ pi ((n − 1)pc +( n − 1)(1 − p)(− ))+(1−pi)(n−1)pd − (1−¯ δ)(n−1)pd ≥ 0
(17)
where p is the symmetric probability that each of the other members cooperates, and ¯ δ is
the uniform discount factor. Obviously, this constraint is invariant to n.H e n c e ,t h eM A C
is also invariant to n,a n di sd e s c r i b e db y( 6 ) .
In order to examine the general case, it will prove more helpful if the scale factor α is
treated as a continuous, rather than a discrete, variable. First, we write an individual’s
response as ψ(P,n,δi) to explicitly express the dependence on group size and on discount









[pi (pjc +( 1− pj)(− )) + (1 − pi)pjd]
14This is easily veriﬁed. Observe: ∂¯ π
∂pi = −P−i(d − c −  ) − (n − 1)  = −P(d − c −  ) − (n − 1)  +
pi(d − c −  ) > −αP(d − c −  ) − (αn − 1)  + pi(d − c −  ). for any α>1.
14where P∗
n ≡ np∗(n,δ
n) is the maximal aggregate cooperation in the n-group. If this partial
derivative is positive (negative), then member i increases (decreases) his contribution if both
group size and its aggregate contribution is scaled up by α<1.




ipi = p∗(n,δ). Then, for any scale factor α>1, and for any group member i =1 ,...,n





⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
> 0 if δi >p ∗(n,δ)μ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ
=0 if δi = p∗(n,δ)μ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ
< 0 if δi <p ∗(n,δ)μ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ
(19)
I nw o r d s ,t h es i g no fam e m b e ri’s marginal response to scale α depends on whether
or not his discount factor lies above the threshold p∗(n,δ)μ +[ 1− p∗(n,δ)] γ.T h e s c a l e
factor α does not appear in (19), meaning that sign of the individual’s marginal response is
invariant to scale. Of course, the magnitude of one’s marginal response does depend on the
magnitude of the change in scale.
An obvious corollary to the Theorem 3 is that an interior MAC exhibits increasing
(decreasing) returns at every scale factor α>1 if
δi > (<) p
∗(n,δ)μ +[ 1− p
∗(n,δ)] γ, ∀i =1 ,...,n. (20)
Of course, (20) is only a suﬃcient condition, and a strong one at that. Yet, it turns out that
a natural asymmetry exists between the increasing an decreasing returns cases. To show
increasing returns, one need only compare the average discount factor with the threshold.
Theorem 4 Let 0 <p ∗(n,δ) < 1 denote the MAC of any PD game of size n.O r d e rt h e
discount factors in ascending order:
δ1 <δ 2 < ···<δ n
and let i∗ be the largest index i for which ψ(P∗
n,n,δi) < 1 (i.e., the response of each member
i =1 ,...,i ∗ is less than one).
Then, if n






∗(n,δ)μ +[ 1− p
∗(n,δ)] γ, (21)
15δ1 
γ         p
∗μ + (1−p
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Figure 3: Returns to Scale in the 2-Member Group
then the MAC exhibits increasing returns to scale at every scale factor α>1.
According to the Theorem, the MAC exhibits increasing returns to scale if Inequality
(21) holds and the initial group is large enough. The left hand side of (21) is the average
discount factor among those who do not cooperate fully. The right hand side is the same
threshold condition as in (19) which determines whether an individual’s marginal response
to scale is positive or negative. Hence, (21) requires that the conditional average discount
factor of the group is above this threshold.
Signiﬁcantly, the Inequality (21) fails when discount factors are identical. In that case,
recall that the MAC is given by (6) which is invariant to size. One can check in that case
that the left and right hand sides in (21) are equal, and so the marginal response to scale of
every member is zero. Figure 4 exhibits returns to scale in the 2-member group. Constant
returns occur in the "full cooperation" region and along the 45 degree line where discount
factors are identical. Increasing returns occur where (21) holds. Decreasing returns occur
where the threshold condition for both individuals fail or where it fails for one individual
and the other is no longer an "interior" cooperator.
The proof combines the previous Theorem 3 with a convexity argument. Roughly, we
prove that an individual’s marginal response to scale is convex. A simple Jensen’s Inequality
argument establishes that if the conditional average discount factor exceeds the threshold
16p∗(n,δ)μ+[1−p∗(n,δ)] γ then the group’s marginal response to a change in scale is positive.
Hence, the MAC exhibits returns to scale.
To get a better idea for why result indicates increasing rather than decreasing returns,
consider two individuals, with discount factors δH,δL, respectively, with δH >δ L. The high
or patient type has a discount factor above the threshold: δH >p ∗(n,δ)μ+[ 1−p∗(n,δ)] γ.
The impatient type lies below it. If the incentive constraint in the “PD" game in (16) binds







A simple inspection of (22) reveals that pi increases in one’s own discount factor, and
decreases in the ratio of uncooperative to cooperative behavior of others, (n−1−P−i)/P−i.
In this two person case, this ratio is (1−pL)/pL for the patient player and is faces (1−pH)/pH
for the impatient player.
If the group size, say, doubles, then the patient individual faces another patient type
as well as two impatient types. The ratio of uncooperative to cooperative behavior be-
comes (3 − 2pL − pH)/(2pL + pH) which is smaller than before. Hence, the patient player
responds positively. The opposite is true of the impatient player who responds negatively
in equilibrium. Returns to scale exist if the positive response of the patient player exceeds
the negative response of the impatient one. This turns out to be the case. The reason is
simple. The incentive constraints measure current gains to deviating against future losses
from punishment in the equilibrium continuation. The cooperation ratio (n−1−P−i)/P−i
is used to determine each member’s discounted average payoﬀ in equilibrium. An impatient
player is less responsive to changes in this ratio because he is less responsive to the changes
in the resulting equilibrium path. Hence, although his cooperation ratio is inferior when
the group size doubles, his response (as reﬂected in (22) ) is ultimately dampened by his
impatience.
7 Summary and Discussion
This paper deﬁnes and characterizes maximal average cooperation (MAC) for a group of
individuals in a class of repeated, collective action games. Because the equilibrium from
which the MAC is calculated is stationary, any changes in the MAC are presumably due
only to changes in the equilibrium set. Hence, performance of groups of diﬀering size and
composition may be compared. The results show that homogeneous groups are, ceteris
parabis, more cooperative, and for certain stage games, larger groups are more cooperative
as well.
The results do not, of course, imply that social planners should construct purely homo-
17geneous groups. Nor should they attempt to form groups of arbitrarily large size. Returns
to homogeneity may be balanced by beneﬁts to diversity along other dimensions. Returns
to size may be balanced by increasing costs of retaining individuals in larger groups. More-
over, the assumption of perfect monitoring in the model is probably harder to justify with
larger groups. Depending on the game, imperfect monitoring may bound the group away
from the Pareto frontier. Finally, it may not be possible to keep constant the distribution
of types when adding to the group. Our results say little about how mergers of diﬀerently
composed groups perform.
Interest in group performance in collective action problems date back at least to Olson
(1965). The ensuing literature comparing the size of a group with the degree of cooperation
in static collective action games is vast. See Sandler (1992) or Marwell and Oliver (1993) for
surveys. Pecorino (1999) takes up the issue of group size in repeated games with uniform
discounting. He calculates the threshold δ required for full cooperation. Though the thresh-
old increases in n,P e c o r i n oﬁnds that for certain quasi-linear payoﬀs, as n →∞the limiting
threshold δ is less than one in the limit. Consequently, full cooperation is sustainable for
arbitrarily large groups.
There are also studies that ﬁnd, as in the present paper, reversals of the Olson Con-
jecture. These include Esteban and Ray (2001), McGuire (1974), and Chamberlin (1974).
They show that an increase in group size may increase the total provision of the public
good, even though individual contributions may fall. The present model shows something
stronger. Namely, an increase in group size may lead to increase in the average contribution.
It is worth emphasizing that it is the repeated nature of the problem, coupled with het-
erogeneous discounting, which accounts for this increase. Our paper provides an interesting
contrast with static Bayesian environments when the number of agents goes to inﬁnity.
When valuations are privately observed, well known results of Rob (1989) and Mailath and
Postlewaite (1990) show that the likelihood of eﬃcient provision of a public project decreases
(and goes to zero) as the number of agents increases. In these models, each player becomes
informationally small as the number of players increase, but not small enough relative de-
clining likelihood of being pivotal in determining the outcome. In the present model, the
repeated game keeps each player pivotal even as n increases. Any player who deviates in
our model can shift the continuation payoﬀ for everyone in a discontinuous way. Whether
our results extend more broadly is an open question.
188 Appendix
8.1 Proofs of Lemma 1 and Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 1 We prove that Q is decreasing in pi. Observe that by Monotonicity
(A2), π(0,P − pi) is strictly decreasing in pi. Hence, it suﬃces to show that [π(pi,P) −
π(0,P − pi)] is strictly decreasing in pi.L e t˜ pi >p i.O b s e r v et h a t
π(˜ pi,P) − π(pi,P) ≤ π(˜ pi,P− pi) − π(pi,P− pi) ≤ π(˜ pi − pi,P − pi) − π(0,P− pi)
<π (˜ pi − pi − (˜ pi − pi),P− pi − (˜ pi − pi)) − π(0,P− pi)= π(0,P− ˜ pi) − π(0,P− pi)
(23)
Here, the ﬁrst inequalities follows from Submodularity (A4). The second inequality follows
from Concavity (A3). The third from (joint) Monotonicity (A2). Re-arranging terms gives
π(˜ pi,P) − π(0,P− ˜ pi) <π (pi,P) − π(0,P− pi)
which gives the desired monotonicity result.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2We ﬁrst verify (11) if P>1. Notice that (11) is just the incentive
constraint for pi =1evaluated at equality and without restricting r to be in [0,1).B y
Lemma 1, Q(pi,P;r) ≥ 0 for all pi if and only if Q(1,P;r) ≥ 0. Hence, δ(P) is the inﬁmum
among r that satisﬁes Q(1,P;r) ≥ 0. In particular, since for all such r,
Q(1,P;r) ≡ π(1,P) − (1 − r)π(0,P − 1) ≥ 0
and since π(1,P) <π (0,P− 1) by Monotonicity, Equation (11) holds for r = δ(P).
Next, note that by construction of δ(P) in (10), if δi >δ (P),t h e nQ(1,P;δi) > 0.
Finally, if δi ≤ δ(P),t h e nQ(min{1,P},P;δi) ≤ 0. If this were not the case, i.e., if
Q(1,P;δi) > 0 for some δi ≤ δ(P),t h e ns i n c eQ is increasing it follows that Q(min{1,P},P;δ(P)) >
0.I n t h a t c a s e , δ(P) could not be the inﬁmum as deﬁned in (10). We conclude that
Q(min{1,P},P;δi) ≤ 0 for δi ≤ δ(P).S i n c e Q(0,P;δi) > 0 the Intermediate Value
Theorem implies the existence of a p ∈ [0,min{1,P}] such that Q(p,P;δi)=0 .
8.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Fix δ. To simplify notation for the proof, we deﬁne Ri(P)=R(P;δi), ψi(P)=ψ(P;δi),
and Ψ(P)=Ψ(P;δ).F i r s t ,w es h o wt h a tψi is continuous. Using the previous Lemmatta,
observe, ﬁrst, that δ(P)=∞ for all P ∈ [0,1] and δ(·) is a decreasing, continuous function
19on (1,n].C o n s e q u e n t l y ,δi ≤ δ(P) for all P ∈ [0,P0
i] where δ(P0
i)=δi.N o t et h a tP0
i > 1.
By the Implicit Function Theorem, the implicit function Ri is therefore continuous on
P ∈ [0,P0
i]. Observe also that Ri(0) = 0 and Ri(P0
i)=1 . Finally, since ψi(P)=1for all
P>P 0
i (i.e., δi >δ (P)), we have established that ψ is continuous.
Given the continuity of ψ for all i, it is clear that Ψ is continuous. Hence, By Brouwer’s
Theorem, Ψ has a ﬁxed point. Now observe that the set of ﬁxed points corresponds to the
intersection of the graph of Ψ with the graph of the 45 degree line. Since both are closed sets
in [0,n]2, the graph of the set of ﬁxed points is a closed subset of [0,n]2 and so is compact.
Hence, the maximal ﬁxed point exists.
We now show that the MAC p∗ coincides with ˆ p such that nˆ p is the maximal ﬁxed point
of Ψ.L e tP ∗ = np∗ and ˆ P = nˆ p. We show that P ∗ = ˆ P. Suppose ﬁrst that P∗ < ˆ P.B u t
since ˆ P = Ψ( ˆ P), there exist ˆ p1,...,ˆ pn such that ˆ P =
P
i ˆ pi and Q(ˆ pi, ˆ P;δi) ≥ 0.H e n c e ,
ˆ p1,...,ˆ pn all satisfy incentive constraints and achieve a higher aggregate (hence average)
level of cooperation. But this contradicts that fact that p∗ is the MAC.
Consider, instead, that P ∗ > ˆ P.S i n c eˆ P<nwe assert that Ψ(P) <Pfor all P>ˆ P.
Suppose this were not the case. Then Ψ(P 0) ≥ P0 for some P 0 >P . But since then
the map Ψ restricted to [P 0,n] satisﬁes the assumptions of Brouwer’s Theorem, there is a
ﬁxed point P 00 ∈ [P 0,n] which contradicts the maximality of ˆ P.H e n c e ,Ψ(P) <Pfor all
P>ˆ P, and, in particular, Ψ(P∗) <P ∗. Then it holds that for at least one individual i,
ψi(P ∗) <p ∗
i.G i v e n t h e d e ﬁnition of ψi,e i t h e rψi(P∗) is the root of Q(·,P∗;δi)=0or
ψi(P ∗)=1and no root in [0,1] exists. In the case of the former, since Q is decreasing
in pi,w eh a v eQ(ψ(P∗),P∗;δi)=0>Q (p∗
i,P∗;δi). But this implies that p∗
i violates the
incentive constraint, a clear contradiction. In the case of the latter, ψi(P∗)=1<p ∗
i.T h i s
is a contradiction: since no root exists, p∗
i violates incentive constraints in this case as well.
We conclude that P∗ = ˆ P.
8.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Write Ψ(P,n;δ) to express the explicit dependence on size n and structure, δ. By standard
results for second order stochastic dominance, it suﬃces to show that for each i, ψ is
increasing and concave in δi.
Fix i. We now show that ψi is increasing and weakly concave in δi for each P.I nt h e
range of δi such that δi ≥ δ(P),t h e nψi(P,δi)=1 , and so weak concavity holds trivially.
Consider then the range of δi such that 0 ≤ δi <δ (P).I nt h i sc a s e ,ψ(P;δi)=R(P,δi)
where, as before, R(P,δi) is the pi-root of Q(pi,P;δi)=0which is known by previous
arguments to uniquely exist in this range. That is,
20Q(ψ(P,δi),P;δi)=−(1 − δi)π(0,P− ψ(P,δi)) + π(ψ(P,δi),P)=0
Consider P>0 which, combined with the supposition 0 ≤ δi <δ (P) implies 0 <
























<π (0,P− ψ(P,δi))D1π(0,P− ψ(P,δi)) + π(0,P− ψ(P,δi))D2π(0,P− ψ(P,δi))
< 0




Next, we show that
∂ψ
∂δi is decreasing in δi.S i n c e ψi is increasing in δi,t h eI n v e r s e




−[π(0,P− pi)D1π(pi,P)+π(pi,P)D2π(0,P − pi)]
[π(0,P− pi)]2 (25)
Hence, it suﬃces to show
∂δi
∂pi is increasing in pi (i.e., the inverse function δi(·) is convex).


























Observe that F 0(pi) > 0 iﬀ π(0,P−pi)D11π(pi,P)+D2π(0,P−pi)D1π(pi,P) < 0.B u t
the latter is easily veriﬁed using the Concavity and Monotonicity Axioms.
Next, observe that G(pi) > 0 and, by Concavity, H0(pi) > 0. By monotonicity of the
logπ in its second argument, H(pi) < 0.H e n c e ,i ts u ﬃces to show G0(pi) < 0,o r ,i no t h e r
words, G(pi)=
π(pi,P)
π(0,P−pi) is decreasing in pi. But this holds directly by the Monotonicity
Axiom. Hence, we have established that ψi is increasing and concave in δi.
8.4 Proof of Theorem 3
The incentive constraint may be expressed in this case as
Qi(pi) ≡ (μ − γ)p
2
i − (P(μ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)pi + Pδi ≥ 0 (27)
where μ = d−c
d and γ =  
d. The following Lemma will prove helpful for the remainder of the
proof.





R(P;δi) if δi <μ + γ n−P
P−1 or if P<1
1 if otherwise
(28)
where R(P;δi) is one of the two real roots of the quadratic function Qi in Expression
(27) and is given by
R(P;δi)=
P(μ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi −
p
(P(μ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)2 − 4(μ − γ)Pδi
2(μ − γ)




i + Bpi + C ≥ 0 (29)
22where A = μ − γ, B = −[P(μ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi] and C = Pδi > 0. It is easily veriﬁed
that the roots of (29) are real.15
Without loss of generality, consider the case in which pi > 0, it follows that P>0,a n d
so C>0.T h e nQ(0,P;δi)=C>0. To begin, let P>1.
Since μ>γwe have A>0 and B<0. Q0(pi,P;δi)=2 Api + B and therefore
Q0(0,P;δi) < 0.S i n c eA>0 we have two positive real roots. We also know by the previous
results that pi must be the maximum value in [0,1] consistent with Q(pi) ≥ 0.T h a ti s ,
pi =m a x {p
0
i ∈ [0,1] : Q(p
0
i,P;δi) ≥ 0}
Then pi < 1 is a solution iﬀ the lower root of Q is less than 1 while the greater root of Q is










Since A>0, we can write this with some algebra as A + B + C<0,o r ,e q u i v a l e n t l y ,
(μ − γ) − (P(μ − γ)+γ(n − 1) + δi)+Pδi < 0.S o l v i n g f o r δi, δi <μ− γ + γ n−1
P−1, and,
hence, δi < d−c
d +  
d
n−P
P−1.T h e r e f o r e ,pi = R(P;δi) whenever δi < d−c




the case of P>1.
Finally, we note that when P ≤ 1, the constraint that binds is no longer that pi ≤ 1,
but rather that pi ≤ P.
The Rest of the Proof From Lemma 3, ψ(αP ∗












n μ +( 1−
P∗
n
n )γ. Hence, it is without loss of generality if






















15See the Working paper version, Lagunoﬀ and Haag (2005b) for details.




αP(μ − γ)+γ(αn − 1) + δi −
p








Substituting for A, B,a n dC and diﬀerentiating with respect to α, one can verify that
∂R∗





which is the requisite threshold condition whenever P satisﬁes P
n = p∗(n,δ).
8.5 Proof of Theorem 4
T h ep r o o fi si ns e v e r a ls t e p s .F i r s t ,w es h o wt h a t
∂ψ3(αP n,αn;δi)
∂α∂δ2
i > 0, ∀α>1.I no t h e rw o r d s ,
the marginal response ∂ψ/∂α is convex in δi. Then, using Jensen’s inequality, we can show
that if the conditional average of discount factors is above the threshold given, there are







































































































24After substituting in for A = μ − γ,B = −(αP(μ − γ)+αγn + δi − γ), C = αPδi and
∂B
∂α = −(P(μ − γ)+γn), ∂C
∂δi = αP, ∂C
∂δ∂α = P, ∂C
∂α = Pδi, and noting that (δi−γ)2 <γ 2 and




The derivative with the right-hand side with respect to α is negative for α ≥ 1,t h u sw ec a n
take as a suﬃcient condition that α =1and thus
∂ψ
∂α
is convex if γ>
n
(n − 1)2.














































The ﬁrst inequality is a straightforward application of Jensen’s Inequality. The second
follows from Theorem 3. Consequently,
∂Ψ(αP∗
n,αn;δ(n))
∂α > 0, and because Ψ is increasing in

































αn is the maximal aggregate of the αn-group, it follows that Ψ(P ∗
αn,αn,δ(αn))=
P∗
αn.S i n c e Ψ is increasing and concave in P ( s e eP r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 ) ,t h ed i ﬀerence
Ψ(P,αn,δ(αn))−P must be decreasing in P. Therefore, P∗
αn >α P ∗
n which means that the
MAC exhibits increasing returns. We conclude the proof.
16Again, see Haag and Lagunoﬀ (2005b) for details.
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